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This compilation of interviews with intelligence officials, assembled with
introductions a few years ago by history professor Ralph Weber at Marquette
University, finds a useful place in the literature on intelligence and in the class-
room as a supplementary reader for courses on intelligence, national security,
and foreign policy.
The interviewees will be well-known to students of intelligence.  Not all of
them are “spymasters,” as the title claims (a term best left to directors of Central
Intelligence – DCIs – or at least case officers running agents in the field), but
they are an all-star line-up of intelligence (make that Central Intelligence
Agency) notables.  They include, in order of their appearance in the anthology:
Sidney W. Souers, the first director of the Central Intelligence Group (precursor
to the Central Intelligence Agency); Allen Dulles, the most legendary of the
DCIs; Richard M. Bissell, architect of the U-2 and the Bay of Pigs invasion;
Samuel Halpern, one of the most talented of the CIA’s operatives; Lyman B.
Kirkpatrick, Jr., Executive-Comptroller of the CIA from1961-65; Robert Amory,
Jr., one of the CIA’s brightest analysts in the 1950s and early 1960s; Ray S. Cline,
who headed the CIA’s Intelligence Directorate during the 1960s and the State
Department’s Intelligence and Research division in the early 1970s; John
McCone, DCI at the time of the Cuban missile crisis; Richard M. Helms, DCI
from 1965-73; and William E. Colby, DCI from 1973-76.  
That group sums up to five DCIs (Dulles, McCone, Helms, Colby, and
stretching the term a bit, Souers – a most remarkable man who also served
Truman as the first White House executive secretary for national security, the
precursor to the role of national security adviser, an office established by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower); two operatives (Halperin and Bissell, the lat-
ter also something of a scientific whiz as displayed in his leadership for the U-2
development); two analysts (Amory and Cline); and an administrative overseer
(Kirkpatrick).  Missing from the list of specialities is someone prominent in the
counterintelligence side of the CIA.  
All the interviews but one (Weber’s with Halperin) had been either pub-
lished or recorded as oral histories prior to their appearance in this volume; but
most would be difficult for the average reader to find – such as the archives at
the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, in the case of
the longest interview (with Helms).  So Weber provides a valuable service to
intelligence scholars by digging up these “lost” documents and presenting them
in this volume.  He also provides a lengthy introduction of his own about the ori-
gins of the CIA, as well as brief profiles on each of the book’s personalities
(placed before each interview).
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Several of the interviews are fascinating.  Among them are Weber’s own
session with Halperin, a smart man who is inclined to tell it like it is.  In response
to Weber’s question about which DCI has been most popular, Halperin responds
in this manner (which, according to my own interviews at the CIA, seems to be
something of a consensus among Agency people).  “Allen Dulles was probably
the most popular among the troops, junior, middle, and senior,” Halperin said.
“The most effective Director was [General Walter Bedell] Smith first, McCone
second, then probably Helms and Dulles.”  Halperin ends his remarks with per-
haps the most important point in the entire volume: “… unless the DCI is able to
walk in to see the President at will, privately, except maybe for the secretary, just
these persons – unless that’s possible, you don’t have a DCI.”
Some of the interviews are more candid than others, and Dulles and Helms
in particular are inclined to take us for a waltz now and then.  Dulles mentioned
nothing in his 1964 interview  about CIA assassination plots against the Cuban
leader Fidel Castro and is generally coy about what he told President John F.
Kennedy regarding Agency operations in Cuba; and Helms insults every reader’s
intelligence by his claim that “the CIA never has assassinated anyone.”  While
technically true, the CIA tried very hard to kill a number of foreign leaders (such
as Castro and Patrice Lumumba of Congo), but either failed (Castro) or were beat
to the punch by other assassins (in the case of Lumumba, intelligence agents
from Belgium, whose government also sought regime change in Africa’s “heart
of darkness”).  Such comments serve to reduce Helms’s credibility on the print-
ed page, as it did his testimony before Congress, where he had a reputation for
slipperiness.
This is a treasure trove of information about the views of leading intelli-
gence officials from an earlier era – not always to be taken at face value, to be
sure, but largely straight-shooting and with many insights and vivid recollec-
tions.  Journals would do well to publish more interviews of this kind; they read
with the interest of plays and, in the hands of a skillful interviewer, can be far
more revealing than government documents or memoirs.
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